Oil and Gas by Flittie, William J.
SMU Law Review
Volume 21




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





N THIS summary, Texas Supreme Court cases are first presented, with
the exception of one case of overriding importance destined for ultimate
disposition by the supreme court. That case is Texas Oil d Gas Corp. v.
Vela.
1
In 1964 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, dealing
with a Texas lease, held that an unusual royalty clause requiring cash pay-
ment for oil and gas "at the market value prevailing for the field when
run" required payment at current gas prices, not the prices set in a twenty-
year gas sales contract entered into in 1950, though those prices were ad-
vantageous when made Though distinguishable by that peculiar phrasing,
the precedent was followed in the Vela case, where the royalty clause for
gas is in the standard phrasing of "one-eighth of the market price at the
wells." The facts of Vela show a 1934 life-of-the-lease gas sales contract at
2.3 cents per MCF, probably advantageous, and at least reasonable, when
made, but about 11 cents per MCF out of line with the post-1960 prices in
terms of which the deficiency is claimed. The difficulties of proving market
value of gas also are a substantial part of the Vela litigation, but the pri-
mary issue is the meaning of "market value" or "current market value."
When the problem is expanded to recognize the implied covenant obliga-
tion of the lessee to market as soon as practical and the realities of the gas
business in which long term contracting is mandatory if a sale is to be
made, it is by no means certain these words should not relate to values as of
the time of contracting. Four corners and latent ambiguity rules of con-
struGtion might well cause the supreme court to arrive at an opposite result
when it reaches the case. But now, even further complicating the matter,
the Fifth Circuit has remanded two comparable cases under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine for a determination by the Federal Power Commission
of whether it will claim the right to control, as rates, gas royalty prices
and increases of prices where jurisdictional interstate gas is involved! Be-
cause there probably are many more leases with interstates sales commit-
ments than purely intrastate commitments there now is a problem as to
whether there is state jurisdiction in a majority of these cases.
* B.Sc.L., University of Minnesota; LL.B., Columbia University. Professor of Law, Southern
Methodist University.
1 405 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted, 20 Sw. L.J. 940.2 Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964).
'J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966); Weymouth v. Colorado Inter-
state Co., 367 F.2d 84 (Sth Cir. 1966).
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In another important case the supreme court held that the estimated
market demand to be distributed to wells in a pool cannot be restricted
below that figure if the production can be obtained without physical waste,
even though correlative rights are derogated in the process." Involved were
pools containing small tract rule 37 exception wells, still under the now
discredited one-third well-two-thirds acreage distribution formula because
not timely attacked when the special field rules were adopted. Market de-
mand was estimated as the usual summation of producer forecasts under the
statewide rule. Mathematically there resulted an estimated market demand
so great that regular tract wells, produced at maximum permitted capacity,
could not produce the well allowables assigned. Hence they were classified
as limited capacity wells, permitted to produce that maximum, and the
balance of the pool demand became available to the small tract wells under
the well distribution formula. This permitted them to produce far in excess
of their "fair share" on a relative-reserves-represented basis, with conse-
quent drainage of the large tracts. A dissenter would have permitted the
Railroad Commission to use a special alternative formula designed further
to restrict below market demand to improve correlative rights balance on
the theory that this element properly is considered in ascertaining "lawful"
market demand. With "rule of capture" the basic law, however, it is not
possible to pronounce the effects of a well distribution formula illegal so
long as wells do not exceed maximum permitted rates of production. The
majority suggested that summing producer forecasts need not be the sole
means of estimating market demand to be distributed to wells. This may
be a partial solution. Beyond that, however, to fully protect correlative
rights it would seem the Railroad Commission would have to adopt hew
well distribution formulas in the older pools. Though the courts will not
compel this done, there can be little doubt but that an administrative body
has the power so to do. Whether the Commission will wish so to do is
another matter, particularly when it be considered it could not stop at the
halfway house of ameliorating the situation, but would have to go all the
way in terms of the now enforced "fair share" concept. The old unfair
formulas are not protected from assault by substantive law; only by the
procedural quirk that in the great majority of pools now producing ap-
peals were not timely taken.
In Railroad Comm'n v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co.,5 construing the
Common Purchaser Act in a natural gas situation, the supreme court up-
held the Commission in its order to make a 3,610-foot gathering line ex-
tension and to take gas from pools, without discrimination, where no com-
' Railroad Comm'n v. Woods Exploration Co., 405 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. 1966). See generally Note,
Oil and Gas-Proration-The Railroad Commission's Authority To Protect Correlative Rights,
in this issue.
3405 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1966). See generally Note, supra note 4.
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petitive take was occuring, but which geographically were in a "field" area
from which other production was being purchased. Contract terms, includ-
ing price, were ordered negotiated under compulsion of the order. The
opinion does not consider that the gathering line extension ordered was
over one leasehold surface to serve minerals underlying another. Also un-
remarked is the fact that this case involved a purely intrastate situation-a
rarity when one considers that most gas fields either have interstate pur-
chasers or are near enough to fields that do to bring into play the Common
Purchaser Act's further command against unjust and unreasonable discrim-
ination among separate fields. But since 1963 it has been crystal clear that
no state ratable takes can be imposed on these purchasers because of federal
Natural Gas Act exclusive regulation.' What is the correct solution when
federal pre-emption strips from state regulation most of the jurisdictional
base on which that regulation was predicated? Is a rational program of
state regulation, consistent with the state legislative purpose, then possible?
Questions like these remain to be answered.
The issue of whether the Railroad Commission can order makeup of
illegal excess production was decided in favor of such power in Railroad
Comm'n v. Sample' against the contention that the exercise of such a
power amounted to the infliction of an unauthorized penalty. Involved was
illegal excess production from able wells of a lease, falsely attributed to
dummy wells incapable of production, but reported to the Commission and
scheduled by it as marginal wells. The makeup was accomplished by reduc-
ing the normal allowables of the able wells by one-half until excess past
production was made up.
A fairly standard type of lease pooling clause provided for forty-acre
oil units unless governmental authority should "prescribe or permit" larger
units, in which case the lessee could pool to the extent of the units "pre-
scribed." The supreme court held special field rules settirig eighty-acre
proration units, with eighty-acre tolerances permitted, would not support
pooling in 160-acre units.8 The effect is to render the "or permit" portion
of the first phrase entirely meaningless surplusage, which scarcely com-
ports with modern rules of contract construction.
Another construction case involved an unusual lease requiring com-
mencement of a well in 120 days, completion within 120 days after com-
mencement, and if a successful well was so commenced and completed, the
lease was to remain in effect so long as production continued. A well was
commenced and completed as a commercial gas well within the required
intervals, but then there ensued a five-month gap before actual production
'Northern Nat'l Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1966).
405 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1966), 20 Sw. L.J. 690.
'Jones v. Killingsworth, 403 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. 1965).
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could be commenced. No shut-in royalty was involved, so there was neither
actual nor constructive production in this interval. Avoiding an automatic
termination habendum clause consequence,, the -supreme court construed.
the lease as having no primary term. Hence commencement and comple-
tion were full compliance with the lease terms, and production was not
required to hold it at this point." Presumably once actual production did
commence, the usual habendum clause necessity of maintaining it there-
after would arise.
Continental Oil Co. v. Doornbos'" showed this fact situation: There
were outstanding in a prior chain of title a 1/32 royalty, another 1/32
royalty and an open end 1/4 of the royalty (which is a 1/32 royalty if a
usual 1/8 royalty reserved lease is what is made). The grantor reserved an-
other 1/32 royalty. Thereafter the grantor leased, reserving a royalty in
excess of 1/8. He then sought a reformation, effective between grantor and
grantee (but obviously not against the prior 1/4 of the royalty owner)
that 1/4 of the royalty meant 1/32. This would have given the grantee
all royalty in excess of 1/8. Moreover, because the open end 1/4 of the roy-
alty increased as lease royalty increased, the grantee sought a Duhig war-
ranty construction charging the grantor's 1/32 royalty to the extent nec-
essary to cover the increase. Reformation was rejected, there being no evi-
dence the parties had agreed as to how the potential excess burden conse-
quences should be borne even though they may have dealt with the open
end royalty as if it were a 1/32 royalty. All that then remained was a
straightforward chain of title sequence problem with each prior reserved
royalty first satisfied and the grantee entitled to any balance.
Where an undivided mineral interest was leased in terms purporting to
cover the whole tract, then placed in a unit with the unit well off the
lease lands, it was held that the unleased tenant in common of another un-
divided fractional mineral interest in the tract had no basis for sharing in
the unit production allocated to the tract even though, among the owners
in the unit, the tract had been treated as a full mineral interest tract.1" The
unleased tenant in common had not ratified. Had he done so, the result
might have been different.
In other supreme court cases during the period under review it was held
that an oral promise to convey an overriding royalty to a lease finder was
barred by the Texas Trust Act and Statute of Frauds. The court reasoned
that there was an insufficient showing of fiduciary relationship to make
available the constructive trust remedy, whereby the necessity of a writing
sometimes is avoided.'
'Fox v. Thoreson, 398 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1966).
10402 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. 1966).
"Superior Oil Co. v. Roberts, 398 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1966), 20 Sw. L.J. 907.
"Consolidated Gas & Equip. Co. v. Thompson, 405 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1966).
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The compensated retention for six months of a former officer of a
merged company, as consultant, to smooth the merger transition did not
place a fiduciary duty upon the consultant as would prevent his writing a
letter in behalf of his father, mineral owner in one of the leases transferred
in the merger, demanding further leasehold development.'
A separately acquired surface lease to support enlarged oil and gas oper-
ations, to run concurrently for the duration of the oil and gas lease on the
same lands, but with rentals payable in advance, did not terminate for fail-
ure timely to pay rentals."' The result was reached by construing the rental
obligation as a covenant rather than a condition or limitation, but it was
suggested that equitable relief against forfeiture for violation of a condition
-also supported the result.
A drilling cotenant was held not entitled to interest upon sums expended
in the proportionate accounting recovery out of production to which a
drilling cotenant is entitled from the non-drilling cotenant."
A note of warning to oilfield suppliers was given in an instance where
a supplier of tubing and casing attempted to establish its statutory mechan-
ics' and materialmen's liens on the equipment as superior t9 t4t of claim-
ants with mechanics' and materialmen's liens for services a;1 labor. The
court held the liens were of equal dignity, neither enjoying ps4 rity.1 1
The employee of a non-profit producers association with by-laws for-
bidding disclosure, nevertheless, in the proper discretion of the trial court,
could be compelled to give evidence on deposition involving giepogical
information and including secret maps and charts.' The deposi was
concerned with developing salt water injection effects in the Texas
Field. -.
The last Texas Supreme Court case here considered involved liquids
sharing in a gas processing arrangement. The processor of the gas inadvert-
ently inserted the wrong formula in the written contract, but accounted for
years on the basis of the formula intended. Because the supplier of the raw
gas was not shown to have agreed to any but the. formula appearing
in the contract, reformation was denied and the gas supplier held entitled
to recover under the written contract formula-provided an estoppel did-
not exist.' The case was remanded to determine the last issue. There were
dissents stating the basis of estoppel is affirmative deception and that none
had been shown.
"Tennesswe-Louisiana Oil Co. v. Cain, 400 S-W.2d 318 (Tem. 1966)9 20 Sw. L.J. 418. For
further discussion see Pelletier, Corpora i=o, at footnote 16.1 Sirtex Oil Indus., Inc. v. Euigan, 403 SW.2d 784 (Tea 1966).
'Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200 (TeM. 196$), 19 Sw. UJ. 861.
'Lane-Wens Co. v. Contncnutal-Emanco Co&, 397 S.W.2d 217 (Tea. 196s).
"Lehnhard v. Moore, 401 5.W.2d 232 (Tex. 1966), 20 Sw. UJ. 222.
"Champlin Oil & Ref. Co. v. Chastain, 403 S.W.2d 376 (Tea. 1965).
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Presently before the supreme court for review is Andretta v. West'
where the appeals court held the owners of "an undivided one-fourth inter-
est in and to all of the ... royalty ... that may be produced" were royalty
owners only, not entitled to share in lease rentals or, under an extension of
the lease, payments described as "lien royalty" if a well was not drilled.
Despite the nomenclature used, the latter payment, since it performed the
delay rental function, was classified as such and royalty owners were not
entitled to share.
In another case where writ of error has been granted the original lessee
assigned, reserving an overriding royalty, which also attached to renewals
and extensions of the lease. The assignee pooled for gas only and drilled an
off-lease pooled unit well before the end of the primary term, all as pro-
vided in the lease. An oil well was obtained. Thirteen days later another
well was commenced on lease lands under a usual sixty-day dry hole clause.
This well was a lease well, and resulted in lease oil production. Doubting
the efficacy of his lease, the lessee took a new lease about one year after
completion of the second well. The appeals court held the first well the
legal equivalent of a dry hole, implementing the sixty-day clause. Hence,
when the second lease was obtained the first lease was held by its own pro-
duction. Thus the second lease was an extension or renewal of the first lease,
and the overridding royalty attached to it."
Two civil appeals decisions involved the Duhig rule. In the first the
plaintiff conveyed to the defendant, reserving one-half of the minerals.
Then, by warranty deed, the defendant conveyed back to the plaintiff
excepting one-half of the minerals. The effect was held to vest all minerals
back in the plaintiff, the Duhig warranty construction rule not being
varied because the outstanding minerals in the prior chain happened to be
owned by the grantee.' Also involved in this case is the usual rule a tenant
in common cannot adversely possess against another tenant in common
without unmistakably communicating his purpose to the other cotenant.
In the second case there was a 1/64 royalty outstanding in the prior chain.
Conveyance was by warranty deed, reserving a 1/4 mineral interest. The
issue was where the burden of this 1/64 royalty should be charged. Since a
3/4 interest had been warranted without reservation, it was held properly
chargeable against the 1/4 mineral interest reserved.2
In the period under review there were of course many civil appeal cases
turning on interpretation and construction of clauses. Neat categorization
of these cases is virtually impossible because of the multiplicity of rights
'9 402 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.
21 Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkcs, 399 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.
21 Coyne v. Butler, 396 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
22 Selman v. Bristow, 402 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
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affected. In Guaranty Nat'l Bank & Trust v. May"3 the holder of the power
to lease five tracts of land with varying severed royalty interests leased
all five tracts in one instrument containing an unauthorized pooling clause.
The lessee pooled and completed a productive well in one of the five tracts
where the royalty was equally divided between the lessor and a non-rati-
fying royalty owner. A ratifying royalty owner in some of the other four
tracts sought the benefits of pooling against the lessor's half interest. With-
out citing authority the court held the royalties involved could not be
communitized without the joinder of all royalty owners. The refusal of
the supreme court to review can be explained on the alternative ground
of estoppel, arising because the ratifying party seeking participation had
for years taken the benefits of the same apportionment of royalty he here
sought to defeat in the production from another well by virtue of his own-
ership in another of the five tracts.
Hall v. McWilliams"' is a case almost impossible to square with the sup-
posed new Texas rule that a lease does not expire .so long as a reasonable
operator would be expected to hold it in the expectation of resuming prof-
itable production, and not for mere speculative purposes. ' Here produc-
tion ceased because the Railroad Commission suspended a salt water well
injection permit on which producing operations depended. Without going
into details, a new injection had been arranged and full profitable opera-
tions again were in full swing ten months thereafter. The court held that
the lease terminated by operation of law as of the end of the third month
because not maintained by production in paying quantities. Apparently the
sixty-day clause providing that if production "should cease from any
cause this lease shall not terminate if Lessee commences additional drilling
or reworking operations" was read as the only means of continuing the
lease more than sixty days after physical cessation of production. In fact
the clause is permissive, serves another purpose entirely, and is not a sound
basis for setting aside the ultimate habendum duration rule of Texas.
A lessee attempted to avoid liability for failure to drill an offset well by
attempting to release back to the lessors only the affected productive for-
mation. The court held this was no effective release because the clause
contemplated release of all lease lands under a surface description, and the
lessee accordingly continued liable." The lessee also sought to limit the
offset obligation to the minimum well and lease line distances under the
statewide rule, but this was rejected for the obvious reason it would require
drilling in forbidden locations. It would appear that a special offset clause
23 395 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
24404 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
26 Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 401 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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limiting the obligation in terms of governmental drilling units can be im-
plemented only after special field rules set proration units. And, though a
narrow fee strip in another ownership intervened between the draining well
and the demanded offset, the strip was held no bar to actionable drainage.
Again, in an effort to avoid the minimum royalty of $2.00 an acre in a
6,978-acre lease perpetuated by production, the lessee released all but 640
acres two days before the end of the first year after the end of the primary
term and denied obligation on the released acreage for that year. The
court's opinion is to the effect that a usual option to release must be imple-
mented before the inception of a current year, not during it, if it is to be
effective in that year.
Two other civil appeals decisions furnish interesting examples of con-
struction of delay rental clauses. Where assignees of the original lessor had
circulated to them a title curative stipulation and struck from it the payee
bank designated in the lease, inserting the name of another bank, but in an
unexplained manner a delay rental check payable to the new bank was sent
the old, there cleared and deposit made to the assignee-lessor's credit, the
payment was held to be a sufficient compliance with the delay rental obliga-
tion.' One wonders if the result would obtain if the mailing had been
shown to be the lessee's mistake, as it probably was. Or perhaps the circum-
stances of changing the designated bank were so irregular as to justify the
result anyway. In another delay rental case involving a usual form "unless"
lease, timely mailing of a check, not actual time of bank receipt, was held
to be the extent of the lessee's obligation if he would keep the lease in
force."'
In a case involving basic contract construction two wells had been
drilled under prior arrangements including formal contracts requiring
driller indemnity in all circumstances. These contracts never were signed
by the operator. The instant well was drilled under a letter agreement
specifically referencing these contracts for terms and conditions. Through
the driller's negligence the pipe became stuck. It is difficult to understand,
but the court held the reference not specific enough to adopt the terms of
the prior instruments into the letter agreement and that the driller was not
entitled to indemnity.'0
Two cases, one involving negligent leakage of salt water from an unlined
disposal pit" and the other salt water damage from waterflooding opera-
tions," chiefly stand for the proposition that limitations begin to run not
2' Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Robinson, 405 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
28 Carroll v. Roger Lacy, Inc., 402 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
29 Corley v. Olympic Petroleum Corp., 403 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
'OM. V. Delaney Co. v. Murchison, 395 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
"Crawford v. Yeatts, 395 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
"
2 Tenneco Oil Co. v. Rollans, 399 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
[Vol. 21
OIL AND GAS
from the inception of the operations, but when damage was or should have
been apparent even though not yet fully developed and still spreading.
This presents a fact question for court or jury. In a somewhat more
complicated case salt water damage was caused by leakage through seismic
shot holes made by a prior owner of the lease and not sealed off. The cur-
rent lessee, who was injecting salt water, was aware of the condition and
could have foreseen the consequences of not properly cementing his in-
jection string, though unable to locate all the old shot holes. Accordingly he
was liable, and to a surface tenant as well for crop and livestock damage."
The surface lease antedated the oil and gas lease, but no reason is apparent
for a distinction as to tenants because of this.
Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n' supports the Railroad
Commission in its view that it is compelled to permit illegally directed wells
to be redrilled to proper bottom hole locations, at least absent evidence that
production beyond that which would have been possible with a correctly
bottomed well has been obtained. In reaching this result it was held the
Commission properly refused to consider private agreements with adjacent
owners that the illegal wells would not be redrilled, this presumably being
for the courts to determine.
A production payment was deferred to commence after a prior $2,600,-
000 net payout. It was held that failure to list compression and lift gas
expenses in the schedule of expense items to be deducted in arriving at the
net payment meant these items should not be deducted, thereby advancing
the tirne the production payment began."
An option to purchase land providing that "not less than one fourth
(1/4) of the mineral rights and full leasing rights shall go with the place"
was sufficiently definite for specific performance to be ordered."a
When, in consideration of installation of a waterflood project an opera-
tor joined a secondary recovery unit and assigned a production payment to
the unit operator, even though the waterflood was not installed, the further
conveyance of the production payment in a deed of trust transaction with
a bank could not be defeated.' Contentions that the failure to install the
waterflood resulted in an automatic defeasance of the assigned production
payment were met by a determination that only a contractual covenant was
involved.
Affiliated producing and purchasing companies entered into a gas sales
contract. For purposes of the severance tax the state contended the price
was too low and market price should be determined by means other than
'Currey v. Ingram, 397 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n:r.e.
34395 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
"Slavik v. Southern Minerals Corp., 395 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
'o Brevard v. King, 400 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
S'Valor Oil Co. v. Eisner, 396 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
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the contract price. Absent fraud, collusion or bad faith, which had not
been shown, the court held that article 30138 required a construction that
the contract price was the basis for calculating the tax."9
The usual rule that the life tenant is entitled only to income from corpus
when the lease was made after the life tenancy commenced resulted in the
personal representative of the deceased life tenant having to turn over
bonus and royalty payments the life tenant had received.'
Unsubmerged state lands in bays, lakes and islands of the Gulf of Mexi-
co classify as submerged lands, not vacant and unsurveyed school lands,
for mineral leasing purposes. "'
Where a dry hole contribution letter specifically required testing of a
designated zone, which was adequately tested, but the obligation was sought
to be avoided because an unmentioned zone was not adequately tested, re-
liance being placed on general language to furnish accurate information in
the course of drilling, the court held that the drilling party had complied
and was entitled to the contribution.""
Lastly, no vested right in maintaining a sole well in tracts force pooled
by municipal ordinance arose where the ordinance was invalid because,
while it made provision for mineral owner interests, it made none for those
of mineral lessees. Accordingly, when a subsequent ordinance was adopted
permitting another operator a second well in the original force pooled
area, the second well was a legal well. 3
'TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 301 (1959).
'Calvert v. Union Prod. Co., 402 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
4"Hamilton v. Clyde, 405 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). For further discussion see
Galvin, Wills and Trusts, this Survey at footnote 25.
"1Butler v. Sadler, 399 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error 'ef. n.r.e.
4' Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Sears, 400 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
" Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mecom, 395 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
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